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THE SEVENTEEN PERCENT SOLUTION: FORMULA GUIDELINES
FOR DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS ARRIVE IN
NORTH CAROLINA
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.' The
Act created a plan for the establishment and enforcement of child sup-
port in an attempt to control the escalating costs to the Aid to Families
with Dependant Children (AFDC) program.2 The title required states to
institute programs designed to use existing state laws and procedures to
establish and enforce support obligations, thereby alleviating the need of
families so affected to rely on AFDC for assistance.3
While effective to a point, the Act did not fulfill the overall expecta-
tions of Congress,4 so ten years later the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984 were passed. 5 The amendments required each
state to enact specific remedies and procedures within their child support
programs in order to remain eligible to participate in AFDC benefit pro-
grams.6 While the majority of the Act dealt with the enforcement as-
pects of support awards, there was also a specific focus on the
establishment of guidelines for use in determining the amount of awards
in child support litigation.7 North Carolina was no exception to this
1. 42 U.S.C. § 651-662 (1974).
2. D. DODSON & R. HOROWITZ, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New
Tools for Enforcement (The Family Law Reporter Monograph No. 5, 1984).
3. HYLDEN DODSON, The Social Security Amendment of 1974-A Joint State-Federal Child
Support Enforcement Program, I FAM. L. REP. 4049 (1975).
4. DODSON, supra note 2, at I. Census bureau surveys found that approximately 40% of
families theoretically entitled to support orders did not have them, and overall non-compliance with
support orders was at "epidemic proportions." U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Child Support and Alimony: 1981 (Advance Report. See also, Cassetty & Douthitt, Support and
Visitation Schedules, Guidelines and Formulas, I Improving Child Support Practice 1-101 (ABA
1986).
5. Pub. L. 98-378 (1984).
6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 667 reads as follows:
(a) Establishment of guidelines; method
Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this part, must establish
guidelines for child support award amounts within the State. The guidelines may be established
by law or by judicial or administrative action.
(b) Availability of guidelines; binding nature
The guidelines established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be made available to
all judges and other officials who have the power to determine child support awards within such
State, but need not be binding upon such judges or other officials.
(c) Technical assistance to States; State to furnish Secretary with copies
The Secretary shall furnish technical assistance to the States for establishing guidelines, and
1
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mandate. On July 12, 1986, the North Carolina General Assembly rati-
fied an act-designed to comply with the 1984 Amendments to Title IV-
D.
8
This comment will begin with a discussion of the methods historically
used in the determination of support awards. By examining these meth-
ods in light of the questions that can arise in any support litigation, it will
be shown how they foretold of the necessity of implementing some
formula-based control over award determination. The pros and cons of
the use of formulas will be explored, with a particular focus on the guide-
lines eventually implemented in North Carolina. An historical perspec-
tive of support awards and formula use in North Carolina will be
discussed, followed by the history of the implementation of the support
guidelines now in use. The comment will end with a prognosis of the
eventual successes and failures of specific aspects of formula implementa-
tion in North Carolina, and a conclusion as to the overall pluses and
minuses of guideline use.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The inadequacies and inequities of past methods used for determining
child support awards have long been the source of great concern for both
the participants in and observers of the child support system.9 Tradition-
ally, the family court judge has examined the needs of the parties, then
divided the available income in an attempt to meet their respective ex-
penses. o Awards were based on the balancing of two factors: the needs
of the child, and the parents individual ability to contribute to meeting
those needs."1
Difficulties in achieving an equitable division of available income and
at the same time adequately fulfilling the needs of the child have arisen
on several levels. First, there is a triangle of human experiences that
must be factored into the determination: the post divorce situations of
the parents, the pre and post divorce situations of the child, and the influ-
ences acting upon the judge deciding the award. Second, within an ex-
each State shall furnish the Secretary with copies of its guidelines. Effective Date. Section 18(b)
of Pub.L. 98-378 provided that: "The amendment made by subsection (a) (enacting this sec-
tion) shall become effective on October 1, 1987."
8. An Act to Achieve Greater Consistency and Equity in the Setting of Child Support Obliga-
tions Amounts Through the Use of Guidelines, July 12, 1986, (amending N.C.G.S. 50-13.4, effective
Oct. 1, 1987)
9. See generally, BRUNCH, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A Critique of
Current Practice, 16 U.C.D.L. Rev. 49 (1982); CAssETrY & DOUTHrir, Support and Visitation
Schedules, Guidelines and Formulas, I Improving Child Support Practice 1-101 (ABA 1986); GINS-
BURG, Judging the New Support Guidelines, 10 Fain. Advoc. 29 (Spring 1988).
10. GINSBURG, Judging the New Support Guidelines, 10 Fam. Advoc. 29 (Spring 1988).
11. BRUNCH, supra note 9; see also, CASSETrY, supra note 9; HERRELL, Child Support Guide-
lines: A Judge's View, 1 Improving Child Support Practice 1-60 (ABA 1986).
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amination of the award's effect on and by each of these, both economic
and social questions arise. In order to understand the necessity of
formula and guidelines, as well as to adequately judge the merits and
drawbacks of each major formula currently in use, a brief look at each
point on the triangle is necessary.
1. The Parents: Burdens v. Obligations
In the vast majority of cases, children of divorced parents live with
their mothers in sharply reduced economic circumstances. 2 Corre-
spondingly, the fathers in such situations are most often freed from the
majority of household costs, allowing an appreciable increase in their
standard of living. 3 Yet it is a rare instance where a supporting spouse is
asked to provide an amount even approaching their former contribution.
A custodial parent with two children requires 75% to 80% of the former
household income to maintain the intact family's standard of living.
Normally, the child support awards have provided approximately 33%
of that amount.1
4
Adding to the reduction in household income for the custodial parent
are the increases in expenses brought on by the realities of the single
parent family. Often the single parent must re-enter the work force or
increase the time already spent working. This necessitates day care ex-
penses which can easily consume an entire support award.' 5 Increases in
clothing and transportation costs as well as money spent on meals away
from the home add to the single parent's burden.' 6 More time working
means less time at home. That translates into less time.to accomplish
home maintenance chores already increased by those'tasks formerly un-
dertaken by the now absent parent. The purchase of assistance for sim-
ple home maintenance can easily be outside the economic reach of the
12. BRUNCH, supra note 9; See, D. Chambers, Making Father's Pay, 48 (1979); 4 Survey Re-
search Center, U. Mich. Inst. Soc. Research, Five Thousand American Families-Patterns of Eco-
nomic Progress 5,7, at 8, 17 (G. Duncan & J. Morgan eds. 1976); WEITZMAN & DIXON, The
Alimony Myth: Does No Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 172-79 (1980).
A 1977 study in Los Angeles, California, yielded the following statistical information concerning
mothers' greater willingness to assume custody of the minor children following divorce: Although
57% of the sampled fathers stated that the wanted custody, only 38% made any inquiries in that
direction, and only 13% actually requested custody on the petition for divorce. In contrast, 96% of
women involved in a divorce stated that they wanted custody of the children. 88% to 90% of the
final custody decrees entered in Los Angeles in 1977 awarded sole custody of children to their
mothers. WEITZMAN & DIXON, at 517 n. 127.
13. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 51.
14. CHAMBERS, supra note 12.
15. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 54; L. Weitzman, C. Brunch, & N. Winkler, Support Awards and
Enforcement, National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Man and Women in the
Courts, Judicial Discretion: Does Sex Make a Difference? at 78 (NOW Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund 1981); J. Emerson & Bay Area Child Care Project, Children's Council of San Francisco
Report (Dec. 1980) (copy on file at U.C. Davis L. Rev. office).
16. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 54-55.
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custodial parent. 7
Other hidden costs to the custodial parent arise when one- considers
credit given by the court to the supporting spouse for visitation time.
Aside from food and entertainment costs, most other expenses paid by
either parent while enjoying physical custody are duplicative.'8 If an at-
tempt is made to compensate for this in the determination of an award
and some subsequent deviation occurs, (eg. the supporting parent's fail-
ure to exercise visitation rights) the custodial parent must accept the ad-
ditional burden. 19
Expenses such as these have been difficult if not impossible to take into
account using the former child's needs vs. parent's income system.2 ° A
judge, making decisions on a case by case basis, can rarely accommodate
either the time or the expense of assigning an equitable amount to each of
these variables.2' Attorneys, precluded from contingent fees2 2 and often
representing clients already experiencing economic hardship, find the
time it takes to adequately research and present an accurate economic
picture to be cost prohibitive. Therefore, a formula which provides the
court with a starting point based on legislative research incorporating
reasonable averages attributable to such expenses has obvious
advantages. ,
The social ramifications of child support awards often strike the par-
ents in how they relate to the incorporation of their obligations into their
new family relationships. Should a stepparent, bringing additional in-
come to the custodial parent's household, operate to decrease a support-
ing spouse's obligation? Public policy has historically disallowed such a
credit.23 Placing that financial burden on the prospective stepparent
could operate to further impair the already difficult chances of a parent
with custody of children remarrying.24 The flip side of this question is to
what extent should a supporting spouse's former or current familial obli-
gations lessen his duty to pay? Should the fact that a parent now has
children from a second relationship to support increase the burden of the
custodian of his children from the earlier marriage? If it is determined
that a support parent's current obligations should mitigate his duty to
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. CHAMBERS, supra note 12, at 40.
21. Id.; see generally, WILLIAMS, Child Support Guidelines: Economic Basis and Analysis of
Alternative Approaches, I Improving Child Support Practice, 1-1 (ABA 1986)
22. A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: (1) any fee in a
domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of alimony or support..." Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.5(d)(1) (1983); "Contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases
are rarely justified." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20 (1981).
23. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 60.
24. Id.
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support children from an earlier relationship, what effect should his cur-
rent wife's income have on an elevation of his disposable income?"
Should she carry the increased burden for the support of her family be-
cause of her husband's primary duty to support the children of his for-
mer family?
It is easy to see in how difficult a position the family court judge finds
himself. For the most part, these questions are unanswerable to any defi-
nite degree, certainly in the context of making a blanket decision as op-
posed to deciding based on individual case facts. While formulas do not
portend to eliminate these questions, they do give the family court judge
a place to start. Then, after hearing the arguments from both sides, the
specifics may be used to allow deviation from the formula-based figure.
2 6
2. Children: What Do They Cost?
The second obstacle facing the equitable determination of a support
award is the assessment of what it costs to raise a child. There are as
many answers to this seemingly simple question as there are studies of
the topic. 27 The most obvious difficulty is how to separate the cost of one
child from the expenditures which benefit the entire household.28
An economic study done by Thomas Epenshade29  addressed this
question. Epenshade estimated that most household expenditures on
children fall into three categories: food, housing, and transportation. 30 It
is easy to see how difficult it would be to determine a two year old's share
of a three bedroom house, or an eleven year old's share of the cost of the
family car.31 Equally difficult is the task of deciding how much of a fam-
ily meal is attributable to the child taking a portion from the main
platter.
3 2
The easiest place to begin determining a child's needs is at the poverty
level. The 1985 U.S. Poverty Guideline provides a subsistence cost of
$437.50 per month for the first member of the household, and $150.00
25. Id. GINSBURG, supra note 9, at 36.
26. See infra pp. 8-10.
27. See generally, C. EDWARDS, USDA Estimates of the Cost of Raising a Child: A Guide to
Their Use and Interpretation, U.S.D.A. Misc. Pub. No. 1411, (1981); Williams, Development of
Guidelines for Establishing and Updating Child Support Orders: Interim Report 15 (1985); L. Ol-
sen, Costs of Children (1983); P. Eden, Estimating Child and Spousal Support (1977); National Inst.
for Socioeconomic Research, Review of Literature and Statutory Provisions Relating to the Estab-
lishment and Updating of Child Support Awards 33 (1984); T. Epenshade, Investing in Children
(Urban Institute Press: Wash. 1984); T. Epenshade, The Value and Cost of Children, 32 Population
Bull. 43 (Population Reference Bureau 1977).
28. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 4.
29. EPENSHADE, Investing in Children, at 44-59.
30. Id.
31. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 4.
32. Id.
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per month for each additional member.3 3 The next question is whether
parents with incomes sufficient to provide more than subsistence support
have a duty to do so, and if so, how much more should be provided?
The percentage of parental income spent on child care related costs
varies according to income levels.3 4 Epenshade has determined the pro-
portional amounts of income spent on one, two, or three children in vary-
ing income groups. The results indicate that as income goes up, the
percentage spent on children declines. This would seem to indicate that,
on a percentage basis, there is a plateau over which children cease to
benefit directly from a higher level of income.35
It is this kind of information that is easily incorporated into a formula
award system, but is lacking in the old method of support determination.
Epenshade's study indicates that parents spend 26% of a net income of
$0-$8,499, to 16% of an income of $39,O0+ in the support of a single
child.36 However, a study of support awards covering a broad range of
incomes found that an average of 12% of the supporting spouse's pre-
divorce income was allocated for the support of a single child after
divorce.
37
These disparities have been attributed in part to the difficulties judges
have faced attempting to be fair to all concerned. 8 Lack of accuracy in
understanding the realities of the costs of child raising by both judges
and parents, 39 coupled with an overprotective attitude of judges towards
fathers building new lives, have contributed to the inequities of past
awards.' Again, the institution of formulas has provided courts with a
point of reference which has taken these economic factors into
consideration.
Problems arise when extraordinary expenses for a specific child must
be addressed. Formulas must by nature be based on averages rather than
exceptions. How then to determine an award incorporating both the rea-
sonable natural expenses of child rearing and the unexpected costs of a
particular situation? How can the court ensure a child benefits from the
33. 50 Fed. Reg. § 9517-18 (1985).
34. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 8.
35. Id. at 6.
36. WILLIAMS, supra note 34. The figures used in Williams' table were derived from Epen-
shade, Tables 20 and A12, 1972-73 Consumer Expenditures Survey, Table 3, and Current Popula-
tion Reports, Series P-60, No. 145.
37. C. Jones, N. Gordon, I. Sawhill, Child Support Payments in the United States, working
paper 992-03 (Wash. D.C.: Urban Inst., Oct. 1976). See also, J. CASSETTY & F. DOUTHiTr, The
Economics of Setting Adequate and Equitable Child Support Payment Awards, 1 Improving Child
Support Practice, 1-105 (ABA 1986); J. Cassetty, Child Support and Public Policy (1978).
38. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 51.
39. Id. Studies have shown that parents spending approximately 40.7% of their annual income
to raise two children estimated their annual child rearing costs to be 14.7% of their income. Epen-
shade, The Value and Cost of Children, 32 Population Bull. 43 (Population Reference Bureau 1977).
40. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 51. See also GINSBURG, supra note 9; HERRELL, supra note 11.
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higher income standard one parent enjoys? Most formulas state as a pur-
pose the need to maintain a pre-divorce standard of living for the chil-
dren of the marriage. How does the court determine what sacrifices each
parent would have made to provide their children with the "extras" in
life? Formulas alone cannot provide for all of these circumstances. To
compensate, most formulas contain provisions for what are known as
"allowable deviations."4
The first step in arguing for an allowable deviation from a formula
award is to determine what expenses are extraordinary as opposed to
those included in the determination of the formula award. In many
states, deviations are controlled by statute. 42 Apart from statutory crite-
ria, extraordinary expenses have been defined as "any large, discrete, le-
gitimate child-rearing expense that varies greatly from family to family
or from child to child."43 These types of expenses can usually be placed
into one of three categories: physical, educational, and emotional."
Physical costs usually include medical and day care expenses. Care
should be taken to determine the sources of insurance coverage and what
the limitations of the coverage are.45 Uninsured medical expenses as well
as catastrophic expenses can operate to provide for additional support or
adjustments made in the base figures of formula evaluations. For unex-
pected future expenses, post-award changes in circumstances can always
allow for adjustment in awards. Day care expenses are normally looked
upon as being related to employment time constraints. It is important to
examine each situation closely, however, and to include additional time
obligations of the custodial parent when evaluating the duration of child
care needed. In addition, some jurisdictions allow for deviations based
on the value of the child care services provided by the custodial parent.46
Extraordinary educational costs normally include those associated
with college, private elementary and secondary schools, graduate or pro-
fessional schools, special enrichment programs for children gifted in a
particular area, and special educational programs for children who are
handicapped in some manner. Generally impossible to incorporate into a
generic formula, these expenses must be specifically delineated and
awards adjusted accordingly. While the extent of these types of expenses
are obviously limited by the post-divorce incomes of the parents, it is
41. See generally; SMITH, Grounds for Deviation, 10 Fain. Advoc. 22 (Spring 1988); GOLD-
FARB, Dealing with Extraordinary Expenses, 10 Fam. Advoc. 38 (Spring 1988).
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(cl)(1987).
43. GOLDFARB, supra note 41, at 38.
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. Most states authorize the inclusion of a requirement that state agencies seek health insur-
ance as part of the support obligation. According to the Office of Child Support Enforcement, this
obligation should be viewed as an adjunct to, not a substitute for, the obligation to provide periodic
financial support. GOLDFARB, supra note 41, at 40; see also 50 C.F.R. 41887, 41891 (1985).
46. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 762.25(lm)(e)(1983); see also supa, note 61.
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imperative that due consideration to them be given if formulas are to be
equitably implemented.
The last category, that of the emotional needs of the child, is the one
that least lends itself to economic evaluation. Aside from the obvious
emotional trauma accompanying the split of the family, children must
also cope with the "riches to rags" syndrome which often occurs in the
post-divorce custodial household.47 Add to this the emotional roller
coaster the child rides as he visits the relatively wealthy household of the
support parent, then returns to the economically constrained custodial
parent, and the need for further adjustment of the formula award be-
comes evident.48 Since formulas are based on mid-range averages, they
often must be reexamined when dealing with extremely high or ex-
tremely low income families.49 Again, allowing for applicable deviations
from the formula based award can provide both adequate and equitable
solutions to these difficult situations which, under the old system, went
largely ignored.
There are no easy methods for determining what it costs to raise a
child. Harder still is deciding how much of a parent's income and atten-
tion should be allocated to that end. The use of formulas, with allowable
deviations, brings the family court judge much closer to the possibility of
achieving equity than was ever realized under the old system of award
determination.
3. Judges: The Impossible Position
The third corner of the triangle warranting examination of its compar-
ative effects on support awards before and after the implementation of
formula use is that of the family court judge. Certainly a more impossi-
ble position is difficult to imagine. Given the unanswerable questions al-
ready discussed, adding those situations too unique to be examined here,
and dividing them by the time available to decide each case, the problems
facing the trier of fact are amply illustrated.
Even with the addition of formula awards, the family court judge re-
mains responsible for a wide zone of discretion. Most formulas are only
deemed advisory in nature.50 Even those which operate as rebuttable
47. SMITH, supra note 41, at 24.
48. WEITZMAN, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1260-63 (1981).
49. See infra, text pp. 15-21; see also, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13.4(cl)(4) (1987); GINSBURG, supra
note 9, at 29.
50. There are currently 20 states where guidelines in use operate as a rebuttable presumption.
They are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Illinois,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Iowa, Maine and Virginia have guidelines which are rebut-
table presumptions for administrative agencies, but are advisory to the courts. All other states are
advisory at this time. SMITH, supra note 41, at 22.
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presumptions require allowable deviations to work equitably.5 The im-
plementation of formula awards, however, has been seen as the starting
point for alleviating some of the inexplicable variances which have oc-
curred all too frequently under the old System.
A study done of Denver court awards in 1978 found that amounts
allocated for the support of one child ranged from six to forty percent of
the supporting parent's post-divorce income.52 It was observed that in
some cases the child support award was less than the supporting spouse's
monthly car payment. In Michigan, the Administrative Office of the
Court sent a hypothetical to sixty-nine offices of Friends of the Court
asking for recommendations for child support awards under the facts
presented. The responses came back awarding from $0 to $70 per
week.53 These examples serve to illustrate how susceptible awards deci-
sions are to the influences acting on the person making them.
Judge Stephen B. Herrell illustrated how, without formulas, judges
must rely solely on the evidence presented and how this can provide a
less than accurate picture-of the real facts:
[t]he attorney for the noncustodial parent will (and properly so) seek to
"prove" the client had the best year ever just last year, will never make
that much money again; will never get any more overtime no matter
what, and in fact, the employer will be announcing massive layoffs just
any day now. Not only that, the presence of the child in the other par-
ent's home only adds about $75 to the family budget. The custodial par-
ent's lawyer on the other hand will of course seek to "prove" a similar
scenario as'to that parent's employment status; that the noncustodial par-
ent is Secretly about to remarry the wealthy "roommate" and that the
child's presence in the household accounts for over half of the household
expense.54
Of course even with formulas, the judge is still liable to hear somewhat
inflated accounts of reality. However, with a formula upon which to base
decisions and closely defined deviations requiring competent evidence to
implement, a judge is much closer to achieving equity than he has been
without the guidelines..
Specific situations which an attorney litigating child support should
look for to determine allowable deviations have already been examined. 55
Judges should be alert for the same situations. Formulas, used by them-
selves, have the same propensity for inequitable treatment of the parties
51. HERRELL, supra note 11, at 62. See also, SMITH, supra note 41, at 22.
52. YEE, What Really Happens in Child Support Cases: An Empirical Study of Establishment
and Enforcement of Child Support Orders in'the Denver District Court, 57 DENVER L. J. 38-42
(1979).
53. Michigan Friend of the Court Bureau, Proposed Child Support Guideline (draft), State
Court Administrative Office: Lansing, Mich. (1985).
54. HERRELL, supra note 11, at 63.
55. See supra, text pp. 3-10.
9
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as does the judge left solely to the parameters of his own discretion. The
key to successful support awards lies in the marriage of the two methods.
The discretion of the family court judge applied in conjunction with any
advisory or rebuttable presumptive formula is the most reliable method
currently available for achieving fair and functional child support
awards.
III. CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FORMULAS
There are currently four major types of formulas in use or under study
for possible use in determining child support awards. They are the Dela-
ware Melson Formula, the Income Sharing Formula, the Cassetty
Model, and the Wisconsin Formula. There are states whose chosen
method does not fit exactly into one of these categories,56 but their sys-
tems are so closely related to one of the above mentioned formulas that
they do not bear closer scrutiny. In order to better judge the implemen-
tation of the particular formula chosen for use in North Carolina, each of
the four formula types must be understood in both their benefits and
drawbacks.
1. The Delaware Melson Formula
This method of determining child support awards was conceived and
developed by Judge Elwood F. Melson in 1974. 7 Judge Melson's years
on the bench fostered in him a concern with the disparity of child sup-
port awards under the then existing Delaware Statute.58 Judge Melson's
formula went into effect in Delaware in 1979, but has continually been
reassessed and updated with what has been accepted as current economic
data on child care expenditures.59
The basic principles on which the Melson formula is based are as
follows:
1. Parents are entitled to keep sufficient income for their most basic
needs to facilitate continued employment.
56. E.g., Kansas and Washington use a similar economic theory as that of the Income Sharing
Formula, but based on a different percentage table. Minnesota uses the same basis for guidelines as
the Wisconsin Formula, with slight percentage variations and an escalation factor based on the ages
of the children.
57. National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27.
58. Id. Delaware judges were given only moderate statutory guidance, being directed to con-
sider "among other things", the following:
(1) The health, relative economic condition, financial circumstance, income, including the
wages, and earning capacity of the parties, including the children;
(2) The manner of living to which the parties have been accustomed when they were living
under the same roof;
(3) The general equities inherent in the situation.
13 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 514 (1981).
59. DoDSON, A Guide to the Guidelines, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 4 (Spring 1988).
10
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2. Until the basic needs of children are met, parents should not be
permitted to retain any more income than that required to provide the
bare necessities for their own self-support.
3. Where income is sufficient to cover the basic needs of the parents
and all dependents, children are entitled to share in any additional in-
come so that they can benefit from the absent parent's higher standard of
living.
60
Applying these basic rules requires a three-step analysis. First, a de-
termination of each parent's available income for child support must be
made. This starts with each parent's monthly income.6 1 From this fig-
ure, a self-support reserve is subtracted as a "primary support allow-
ance". 62 The remaining income is deemed available for the payment of
child support.63
The next step is to determine the children's primary support needs.
This amount is calculated at subsistence level.6 The amount per child is
totaled,65 and added to that are any extraordinary medical expenses and
child care necessary to permit the custodial parent to work. When added
together, the resulting figure becomes the primary 9upport obligation.
The primary support obligation is then divided between the parents on a
prorata basis according to their individual available income amounts.66
The final step in the Melson Formula is to determine the remaining
parental income available for a standard of living adjustment (SOLA) in
the award. Each parent's primary support obligations are subtracted
from their available income amounts, any additional support obligations
60. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 20.
61. A parent's monthly income is determined considering all of the parent's sources of income.
This includes business expense accounts which provide for meals and transportation which would
otherwise be provided by the parent. Income may be imputed to the non-custodial parent based on
earning capacity if he is unemployed or employed part-time by choice. If this is the case, the custo-
dial parent's homemaking services may be considered as income for up to 50% of the household
income. If the parent cannot meet his support obligations through income, but has assets of a value
sufficient to pay, he may be required to divest himself of those assets. The Family Court of Delaware
Procedure in Deciding Child Support Cases, Form 509P, Rev. 5/84 (1984)..
62. The current reserve amount is $450 per month for a parent living alone. If the parent has
remarried or co-habitates with another adult, the amount of the reserve is one half the amount
allowed for two people, currently set at $630. An additional $100 is allowed for work expenses,
giving a parent in this situation $365 per month (one half of $630 plus $100). WILLIAMS, supra note
21, at 21.
63. Id.
64. This amount is currently set at $180 per month for the second member of the household
(the first being assumed to be the parent), $135 each for the third and fourth members, and $90 each
for every member thereafter. Id., at 24; DODSON, supra note 59, at 10.
65. Added to this total are any extraordinary medical expenses and child care costs necessary
to allow the custodial parent to work. The resulting total equals the primary support obligation.
WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 24; DODSON, supra note 59, at 10.
66. E.g., if the supporting spouse has a $2000 monthly income after his self-support reserve has
been deducted, and the custodial parent has an income of $1000 after deducting the reserve, the non-
custodial parent is required to pay two thirds of the primary support, including any extraordinary
expenses. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 24.
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the parent owes to other children (including those of a current marriage)
are subtracted, and the remaining figure is the amount subject to SOLA
support. The SOLA obligation is determined on a percentage of the re-
maining figure, based on the number of children requiring support.
O ne C hild ........................................................ 15%
Tw o Children ..................................................... 25%
Three Children ................................................... 35%
Four Children .................................................... 40%
Five C hildren ..................................................... 45%
Six or m ore ....................................................... 50% 67
The formula allows for an adjustment when joint custody provides
each parent with physical custody for a minimum of thirty percent of the
time. When such a situation occurs, each parent's child support obliga-
tion is calculated separately and custody each parent enjoys. 6 Further
deviation is permitted in the form of quarterly court ordered supplemen-
tal child support payments to afford periodic relief to the custodial par-
ent and to generally allow the children to share in the non-custodial
parent's higher standard of living.69
In applying this formula in the states which use it,70 the figures arrived
at are construed as a rebuttable presumption.71 Since the parties contem-
plating entering into a child support litigation are aware that there is
little chance of obtaining an award different from that determined under
the formula, settlement outside the court is encouraged. 72 The formula is
also easily used by parents without the involvement of attorneys, al-
lowing parents in an already difficult situation the opportunity to work
things out without requiring outside involvement.73 In Delaware, it is
used in the Delaware Family Court mandatory mediation process, where
as a starting point for negotiations, it provides some parameters for
achieving equity in circumstances already shown as being fraught with
the pitfalls of inequitable decisions.74
One of the major shortcomings of the formula is its inapplicability in
67. WILLIAMS, supra noie 21, at 25.
"The total SOLA shall not exceed 50% of the discretionary income unless there is a prior
finding of specific need." The Family Court of Delaware Procedure in Deciding Child Support
Cases, Form 509P, Rev. 5/84, Part II, Step B (1984).
68. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 25.
69. The Family Court of Delaware, supra note 67, at Part IV; see also, DODSON, supra note 59,
at 10.
70. The states currently using this formula are Delaware, Hawaii, and West Virginia. DODSON,
supra note 59, at 10.
71. See supra, note 50; see generally, SMITH, supra note 41.
72. See generally, National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27, at 22-23; L. BAL-
ISLE, New Formulas to Fairness, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 16 (Spring 1988).
73. National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27, at 22-23.
74. See supra, text pp. 3-12.
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low income situations. The self-support deduction theoretically cuts off
any duty to support if the parent makes less than $450 per month.75 The
court in such instances must then make minimal provisions from the
available income.76
By and large, this is a complete and effective formula. As long as the
subsistence levels are kept up to date and care is taken to obtain accurate
information upon which to base deviations from the formula amounts,
the propensity for fairness and reasonability in support award determina-
tion is contained in this system.
2. Income Sharing Formula
The basic model for Income Sharing stands on two premises:
1. After a divorce, children should be supported at a level commen-
surate with their standard of living before divorce, if this is consistent
with principle two.
2. Where a reduction in standards of living is required because two
households must now be supported, the available resources should be di-
vided between the two post-divorce households in proportion to the
number of members in each home.
77
This model was developed by the Institute for Court Management of
the National Center for State Courts under the Child Support Guidelines
Project. 78 In drafting this model, the intent was to combine the most
authoritative economic data available on child rearing costs with the
principles for guidelines as enunciated by the project's Advisory Panel.
79
This model is by far the most common method adopted by states comply-
ing with the federal mandate.8°
To apply the formula, first the income of both parents are added to-
gether and compared to the table for determining the percentage of the
total to be allocated for child support.8 The percentage amount is then
prorated between the parents based on their proportionate shares of the
75. National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27, at 22-23.
76. Id.
77. I. SAWHILL, Developing Normative Standards for Child Support Payments, I IMPROVING
CHILD SUPPORT Practice 1-119, 121-22 (ABA 1986).
78. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 12.
79. Id.
80. DODSON, supra note 59, at 10. There are currently eighteen states using this system:
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont. See
also, supra, note 56.
81. States using the Income Shares Model may base their system on either gross or net income.
Each has a table with two cross-graduated scales applying a percentage figure based on the number
of children and the aggregate amount of income. For instance, under the gross income table, parents
with one child and an income of $20,000-24,999, would have a support obligation of 16.1% of that
amount. The same income applied to four children would be 35.4%. See Williams, supra note 21, at
14-15.
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total income. The supporting spouse pays the custodial spouse the
amount indicated, while the custodial parent is presumed to be spending
their obligatory share on the child in their custody.1
2
Additional expenses, such as child care and special medical expenses
are added to the basic obligation in the same prorated manner. Further
adjustments are made for variances in traditional custody arrangements.
In cases of joint custody, the expenses incurred by each parent are pre-
sumed to be in approximate proportions to the time spent with custody
of the child.8 3 The child support obligation is calculated for each parent,
and pay-over amounts are determined for the supporting spouse.8 4
The application of this guideline allows a great range of optional im-
plementation. Variances in net versus gross income, ages of supported
children, and number of additional dependents are all easily incorporated
into the system.
There are, however, critics of this model.8 6 It is noted that this plan
takes no notice of family savings, payments on the principal of a home,
gifts, contributions, or personal insurance in determining expenditures on
children. 7 Critics assert that the formula does not require both parents
to be employed, but instead encourages the custodial parent to stay home
and be supported by the non-custodial spouse.88 It has been suggested by
one economist that the supporting spouse's obligation be reduced in pro-
portion to the benefits the custodial parent receives by living with the
children."9 The difficulty in assigning a monetary value to such benefits
is obvious. It has also been argued that such benefits are offset by the
additional stress inherent in the single parent's situation.90
The primary plus to the Income Shares Formula is that it focuses on
maintaining the pre-divorce standard of living for the child as closely as
may be mathematically possible. Its plus, however, is also at the root of
its largest minus. The focus on mathematical standards does not allow
for sufficient deviation from the formula on a case by case basis. While
easy to apply and economic in terms of time and litigation, there are too
many possibilities for the inequitable treatment of the parents. While
keeping both eyes on the task of maintaining the former lifestyle of the
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 18.
85. DODSON, supra note 59, at 10.
86. Id.
87. BERGMANN, Setting Appropriate Levels of Child Support Payments, The Parental Child-
Support Obligation, 115, 116-17 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983).
88. SAWHILL, supra note 77, at 131-38.
89. BRUNCH, supra note 9, at 52-53.
90. Judith Cassetty, PhD., is Chief of Research and Planning, Office of the Attorney General
for the State of Texas, Child Support Division.
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parties, it is too easy to lose sight of the current lifestyle requirements
which must be considered in order to insure fairness.
3. The Cassetty Model
This plan is also known as the Equal Living Standard. The formula
model was developed by Dr. Judith Cassetty,91 for the purpose of ensur-
ing "that the children of divorced parents suffer the least economic hard-
ship possible and continue, to enjoy a standard of living which is as close
to the original pre-divorce level as possible."92 While not in current use,
this model has been recognized for "its alternative conceptual approach
to determining child support."93
The first step in the Cassetty plan is to subtract from the net total
income of both post-divorce households, a poverty level subsistence for
each member of each group. The remaining income is then divided be-
tween the two households proportionately to the number of members in
each.
94
For non-traditional custody arrangements, the model figures are ad-
justed by varying the family size of each household according to the
amount of physical custody.95 Thus, if one child spends 33% of the time
with one parent and 66% of the time with the other, the first household
is calculated based on one and one third members while the second is
said to have one and two thirds members.
One of the major differences between this model and the others ex-
amined is that Cassetty uses total net income of each household unit as
opposed to that of the divorced parent only. That means that income
generated by a current spouse of either parent as well as that provided by
any working children is added into the base figure for application of the
poverty level subtraction. In addition, other dependents of either parent
in their post-divorce households are included at the other end of the
equation.
9 6
There is no built-in adjustment for extraordinary expenses in the Cas-
setty Model. Because there are no working models of this formula cur-
rently in use, it is difficult to say whether such adjustments would be
implemented. 97 Since each parent pays a proportion of their entire post-
91. J. CASSETTY & F. DoUTHITT, The Economics of Setting Adequate and Equitable Child
Support Payment Awards, Tex. St. Bar, Fam. L. Sec. Rep., Special Support and Visitation Issue, at
12 (1984).
92. DoDSON, supra note 59, at 9.
93. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 26-28.
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 29. It is noted that an increased presence in the home of the non-custodial parent
tends to reduce the award amount significantly, while an increased presence in the custodial home
tends to increase the award amount significantly. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 10.
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divorce household income, without retention of any reserve amounts, it is
possible that deviation contingencies would be deemed unnecessary. Be-
cause the formula focuses on the needs of the child to the exclusion of all
but the absolute necessities of the parents, there is little need for the al-
lowable deviations discussed earlier.
It is the same focus, however, that leaves the Cassetty Model open to
the same attacks as the Income Shares Formula experiences. There
seems to be little regard for a balance between the needs of the child and
those of the post-divorce households of each parent. It looks as though
in practice, this model could operate to the detriment of the members of
the parent's current households. As with all formula implementation,
however, much study is required after the formula is put into use to de-
termine the operational inequities of the system.
4. The Wisconsin Formula
The Wisconsin Formula, also known as the Percentage of Income
Standard, is the simplest support award guideline to understand and im-
plement.9" In 1980, the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services adapted the Delaware Melson Formula into an income percent-
age support guideline. This guideline was given to a group of the state's
family law judges and court commissioners and over the next several
years was voluntarily implemented throughout Wisconsin.99 In July,
1987, the Wisconsin legislature made the guidelines a rebuttable pre-
sumption to be applied in all initial child support orders. o The formula
98. National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27, at 32.
99. BALISLE, supra note 72, at 16; see Wis. STAT. §§ 46.25(9) (a) and 767.25(lj).
100. The statutory factors contained in Wis. STAT. § 767.25 for consideration in determining the
fairness of the application of the guidelines are as follows:
(a) The financial resources of the child.
(b) The financial resources of the parents as determined under § 767.255.
(bj) Maintenance received by either party.
(bp) The needs of each party in order to support himself or herself at a level equal to or
greater than that established under 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2).
(bz) The needs of any person, other than the child, whom either party is legally obligated to
support.
(c) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not ended in annul-
ment, divorce or legal separation.
(d) The desirability that the custodian remain in the home as a full-time parent.
(e) The cost of day care if the custodian works outside the home, or the value of custodial
services performed by the custodian if the custodian remains in the home.
(ej) The award of substantial periods of physical placement to both parents.
(em) Extraordinary travel expenses incurred in exercising the right to periods of physical
placement under § 767.24.
(f) The physical, mental and emotional health needs of the child, including any costs for
health insurance as provided for under subsection (4m).
(g) The child's educational needs.
(h) The tax consequences to each party.
(hm) The best interests of the child.
(i) Any other factors which the court in each case determines are relevant.
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awards are presumed to apply in all child support cases unless the court
finds "by the greater weight ,of credible evidence" that the use of the
percentage standard is unfair to the child or any of the parties based on
factors which are enumerated under the statute.' ° '
The formula is based on a percentage of the parent's gross income de-
termined by the legislature to be expended on child rearing in a relatively
constant manner across a wide range of incomes.'I 2 The percentages so
determined are as follows:
17% of the parent's income for one child
25% of the parent's income for two children
29% of the parent's income for three children
31% of the parent's income for four children
34% of the parent's income for five or more.'
0 3
Under the Wisconsin Formula, there is no adjustment for the income
of the custodial parent. It is assumed that the custodial parent will ex-
pend their designated proportion directly on the child without the court's
interference."o There are no formula adjustments for any other factors
previously discussed as allowable deviations, such as medical or day care
expenses, or the varying ages of the children involved. Rather, these fac-
tors are contained in the statutory listings which operate to allow varia-
tions upon the determination of unfairness in the application of the
formula awards.'0°
The 1987 statutes require that the standard be based on gross income
and assets."° Gross income is defined as including 100% of wage and
salary income, interest, dividends, net rental income, self-employment in-
come, and all other income except that gained through public assistance
programs.'0 7 Parents with prior support obligations may deduct those
from the gross income total prior to the percentages being assessed.'o8
The purpose of this design is to allow the formula's implementation to
function like an income tax.' 0 9 The ultimate goal is for such awards to
be automatically applied by employers under a statewide withholding
WIS. STAT. § 767.25(1m) (1987).
101. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Soc. Ser., Percentage of Income Standard for Setting Child
Support Awards, Memorandum (Rev. Dec. 20, 1983) 1 Improving Child Support Practice, at 216
(1986); see also, WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 10.
102. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Soc. Ser., Percentage of Income Standard for Setting Child
Support Awards, 1 Improving Child Support Practice, 219 (1986).
103. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 11.
104. See supra note 100.
105. WIS. STAT. § 46.25(9) (a) (1987).
106. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Soc. Ser., supra note 102, at 220.
107. National Inst. for Socioeconomic Research, supra note 27, at Appendix IV.
108. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 11.
109. Id.
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system. 110
The key to the equitable application of the Wisconsin Formula is the
variety of statutory factors allowing deviation from the percentage stan-
dard. Recognition of this fact is evident in an examination of the changes
which have occurred in the statutory listings from the time of their incep-
tion to the July, 1987 rebuttable presumption legislation."' The use of
the guideline was studied in its advisory capacity for several years prior
to making the standard presumptive. This allowed the practitioners in
the field to "work the bugs out" of the system and cover most of the
contingencies expected to arise by expanding the list of deviation factors.
Wisconsin's original criteria for setting award amounts varying from
the percentage guidelines consisted of eight factors." 12 The focus of the
statutory factors was ostensibly on determining general parameters for a
fair and equitable support award, giving due consideration to the "custo-
dial parent's assets and income, special needs, age and health of both
custodial parent and children and customary station in life, and the abil-
ity of the non-custodial parent to pay determined by income, assets and
debts as well as age and health.""' 3 This turned out to be a somewhat
unrealistic goal in actual practice.
A close examination of this list of factors will reveal an almost exclu-
sive concern for the needs of the child. The parent's ability to pay and
any factor which might operate to make the guideline unfair to the sup-
porting parent was not addressed at all. In 1983, a new introduction was
added to the statute, providing that the court could determine support
payments deviating from the percentage income standard if sufficient evi-
dence was found that the standard was unfair based on the listed fac-
tors." '4 As the formula in its advisory capacity was put into practice,
changes began to appear in the statute, refining and clarifying the allowa-
ble deviations as questions arose and were answered.
The first major changes arrived in 1985. Six new factors allowing for
deviation from the formula percentages were created to take effect on
I 10. WIs. STAT. § 767.25 has been amended since the institution of the guidelines as advisory in
1983 as follows:
(bj): created by 1985 Act 29, § 2362g, eff. July 1, 1987;
(bp): created by 1985 Act 29, § 2362j, eff. July 1, 1987;
(bz): created by 1985 Act 29, § 2362m, eff. July 1, 1987;
(ej): repealed and recreated by 1987 Act 355, § 38m, eft. May 3, 1988;
(em): created by 1985 Act 29, § 2362r, eff. July 1, 1987;
(em): amended by 1987 Act 355, § 39, eft. May 3, 1988;
(f): amended by 1987 Act 413, § 63, eff. June 17, 1988;
(hm): created by 1985 Act 29, § 2362w, eff. July 1, 1987.
WIs. STAT. § 767.25(Im) (1987).
111. See supra, notes 100, 110.
112. Edwards v. Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d 111, 293 N.W.2d 160 (1980).
113. See Wis. STAT. § 767.25(1) (1987).
114. See supra, note 110.
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July 1, 1987.115 These factors reflected occurrences which have been in-
corporated into other formulas which have been discussed above, and
may be said to have a direct influence on the fairness of the financial
burden an order to pay support imposes on the parent. Taken into ac-
count in the new factors were maintenance in other forms received by
either party, (eg. alimony, possession of the family house, health insur-
ance, etc.) the parents' own needs for support, other support obligations
of the parents, unusual custody arrangements, and extraordinary travel
costs for the exercise of visitation rights.' 16 Tacked on as almost an af-
terthought was an additional umbrella consideration, "the best interests
of the child.""' 7
Where the initial set of factors focused almost solely on the needs of
the child, it is easy to see that in five years of practice the inequities of the
formula's implementation regarding the supporting spouse were amply
brought to the attention of the legislature.
With the advent of these additional factors came the next significant
change in the Wisconsin statute: the form of application of the standard
itself. Effective July 1, 1987, was a new introductory paragraph mandat-
ing that except as provided in the list of deviations, courts were to deter-
mine child support awards by using the percentage income standard." 8
The advisory guidelines had become a rebuttable presumption. In addi-
tion, the use of the deviation list was limited to findings based on a higher
standard of evidence.' 19
There are a number of reasons postulated for the changeover to
mandatory guidelines. For one, studies showed that the appellate courts
refused to reverse trial courts for not applying the guidelines so long as
the judge indicated that some consideration was given to the formula
percentages when the award was set. 12 There was also a great discrep-
ancy statewide towards the actual implementation of the system. While
some judges were pleased with the guidelines, others "went out of their
way to find reasons not to apply the percentage standards."'' In order
to facilitate consistency across the state, it would seem trial court judges
required a plan more mandatory in nature.
One of the best reasons for the change lie in one of the greatest advan-
tages of the use of formulas: the shift of bargaining power between the
custodial and the supporting spouse. The effect formulas have had in
115. See Wis. STAT. § 767.25(lm),(bj),(bp),(bz),(ej) and (em) (1987).
116. WIs. STAT. § 767.25(im)(hm) (1987).
117. WIS. STAT. § 767.25(lj) (1987). Subsec. (1j) created by 1985 Act 29, 2360, eff. July 1, 1987.
118. WIs. STAT. § 767.25(1m) (1987). Subsec. (1m) (intro) amended by 1987 Act 37, § I, ef.
Aug. 14, 1987.
119. BALISLE, supra note 72, at 16.
120. Id.
121. See e.g., supra, at 15.
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this area has already been explored. 122 By making the guidelines pre-
sumptive, the bargaining base becomes even stronger. Now that judges
and commissioners can no longer veer from the formula by merely "indi-
cating consideration", litigation of the subject should be curtailed even
further. 
123
It should be noted that included in the amendments brought about in
1987, is the fact that upon appeal for modification of a support award,
application of the guidelines reverts to being within the decision-maker's
discretion.' 24 The only requirement of the court is that it state on the
record the reasons for the finding of unfairness in the application of the
guidelines, and its reasons for the modification of the award.
1 25
Because the presumptive attributes of the guidelines are so new, there
are no published cases questioning the fairness of the application of the
standards in this light. There have been seminars wherein attorneys have
discussed how. to make a case of unfairness based on the standards of
support which have existed in the state since the 1977 amendments to the
statute: that being the standard of living the child would have enjoyed
had there been no divorce. 126 The consensus is that if evidence can be
presented that this standard has not been met, there is room for the trial
court to rebut the presumptive award.
127
There are currently five states using the Wisconsin Formula.'28
Among them is the state of North Carolina. In order to predict the fu-
ture of the standard's use in North Carolina, its current application must
be compared to its corollary in the developmental stages of Wisconsin's
application. By noting the changes the Wisconsin standard has gone
through, the future of the formula in North Carolina may be examined
with the benefit of hindsight, allowing some comers to be cut in the de-
velopment of an equitable implementation. Before making this compari-
son a brief look at the history of support awards and the treatment of
formula use in North Carolina is in order.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1. The Parental Duty to Support Minor Children
The common law doctrine of a father's duty to support his minor chil-
dren after he has left the family made its way into North Carolina
122. BALISLE, supra note 72, at 16.
123. Id.
124. WIs. STAT. § 767.25 (ln)(b) (1987).
125. WIs. STAT. § 767.25(1)(c) (1987)."
126. BALISLE, supra note 72, at 16.
127. Id.
128. The five states currently using the Wisconsin Formula are Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada,
North Carolina, and Wisconsin. Dodson, supra note 9, at 9; see also, supra, note 56.
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caselaw early in the state's history.' 29 Prior to July 5, 1971, this duty
continued under common law until the child reached the age of 21. In
1971, the age limit was statutorily changed to eighteen,' 30 but continued
to place the primary burden of support upon the father of the child.
In 1945, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated:
It is the public policy of the State that a husband shall provide support
for himself and family. This duty he may not shirk, contract away, or
transfer to another. It is not 'a debt' in the legal sense of the word, but an
obligation imposed by law, and penal sanctions are provided for its will-
ful neglect or abandonment. 13'
That the primary obligation for supporting minor children rested on
the shoulders of the father was reiterated under the amended child sup-
port statutes of 1967.132 The mother's support obligations were, there-
fore, secondary, and as such the mother was entitled to reimbursement
by the father under civil action for money spent on the support of their
children. 133 Absent the receipt of sufficient support from the father,
however, (through default, death, or any other reason) the mother's obli-
gation became primary until such time as reimbursement was available to
her. 134
The modem era has brought changes in the income generating roles
between men and women which have been reflected in statutory modifi-
cations to the primary support obligations of parents. N.C.G.S. § 50-
13.4(b) was amended in 1981 to read:
"In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise
warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of
a minor child, and any other person, agency, organization or institution
standing in loco parentis shall be secondarily liable for such support."' 135
This alteration in the primary support obligation was not seen as a dimi-
nution of the father's obligations, but rather as an enlargement of a
mother's responsibilities, accurately reflecting the changes in the normal
ability of a mother to contribute to the support of her children.'
36
The North Carolina courts have always had fundamentally recognized
doctrines of common law and moral law, as well as the statutory inter-
pretation of those doctrines upon which to base placement of the duty
and obligation of parents to support their children. Not so fundamen-
129. Walker v. Crowder, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 478 (1843).
130. "A minor is any person who has not reached the age of 18." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-1
(1971).
131. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452-53, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945).
132. See, N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 50-13.4(a) through (e) (1967).
133. American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Gibbs, 260 N.C. 681, 133 S.E.2d 669 (1963);
Saieed v. Abeyounis, 217 N.C. 644, 9 S.E.2d 399 (1940); Raleigh Banking & Trust Co. v. York, 199
N.C. 624, 155 S.E. 263 (1930).
134. 4 LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW, § 229, 116 (1981).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1981).
136. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).
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tally recognized have been the methods by which awards have been at-
tached to those obligations. An examination of the modem era caselaw
shows that despite what was intended as a uniform basis for awarding
child support, in practice the propensity was for awards that were too
often arbitrary, inequitable and insufficient.
137
2. Determining Child Support Awards
The 1967 statutes provided the basis for support, the limitations of
support, and the method of distribution for support payments. 138 Under
the statutes, awards were to be based on the relative ability of the parties
to provide support (in the order of obligation) and the needs of the child
requiring the support.139 Both criteria are subject to wide interpretation,
necessitating the institution of equally wide judicial discretionary powers
to decide the parameters of each on a case by case basis. 1
It has already been discussed how difficult determining the "needs of
the child" can be.141 North Carolina courts have, on several occasions,
attempted to define the area, but with little success. In Williams v. Wil-
liams,142 the court offered the following self-defeating definition:
It is frequently said that the parent must supply his minor children with
necessaries, but the word "necessaries" is a relative and elastic term.
Necessaries are not limited to those things which are absolutely necessary
to sustain life, but extend to articles which are suitable in view of rank,
position, fortune, earning capacity and mode of living of the parent. Ar-
ticles that might be a luxury to one person may very well be a necessary
to another. The customs and fashions of the time as to articles in general
use may be a factor to be considered. Many articles which at one time
were commonly regarded as luxuries for the few have at a later time
become reasonable necessaries for the many. The standard of living has
been constantly improving. The law requires the parent to do no more
than the best he can to support his child in the manner suitable to his
station and circumstances. 143
This definition seems to define the needs of the child primarily by the
parent's ability to pay. The greater the income of the parents, the
broader the definition of "necessaries" becomes. The family court judge
using this statement as his guide for determining an award would argua-
bly be within his discretion in disregarding the "needs of the child" crite-
ria, and basing his decision instead solely on the parents.
137. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 57 N.C. App. 182, 290 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
138. See, N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 50-13.4(b) (e) (1967).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 50-13.4(b) (1967).
140. Clark, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 15.1 (1968); 4 Lee, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW, § 229 (1981).
141. See Clark, supra, note 140, at 6-10.
142. 261 N.C. 48, 145 S.E.2d 229 (1964).
143. Id. at 57, 145 S.E.2d at 233.
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Later caselaw attempted to more closely define a child's needs and the
parents' corresponding obligations. In 1979, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals stated that necessities "include food, clothing, lodging, medi-
cal care and proper education."'" This definition reflected the statute in
force at the time which provided for support in an amount suitable for
providing "the reasonable needs of the child for the health, education,
and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earning, conditions,
accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, and other
facts of the particular case. 145 The parents' income was taken into ac-
count, particularly insofar as it related to the child's pre-divorce standard
of living, but the judge was allowed to limit the award to the custodial
parent's ability to document expenses in specific areas.
The only appellate review standard placed on the trial court judge's
award determination was whether a basis in factual findings had been
evidenced in the record. The trial court's conclusions of law must have
been "based upon factual findings specific enough to indicate to the ap-
pellate court that the judge below took 'due regard' of the particular 'es-
tates, earnings, conditions and accustomed standard of living' of both the
child and the parents."' 46 This is not a standard specific enough to in-
sure consistency and equity in award decisions.
The problems inherent in the above discussed methodology did not go
unnoticed. Both attorneys, attempting to curtail a judge's discretionary
powers, and trial judges, trying to fashion a reusable plan for award de-
termination, have been trying to "sneak" a formula-based award system
into use for many years. For the most part, they have met with little
success.
3. Caselaw: Early Formula Use
One of the first North Carolina cases appealed in part on the use of a
formula-based award was 1963's Fuchs v. Fuchs.'47 The plaintiff father
and defendant mother were divorced in 1962. In a separation agreement
executed in 1961, it was agreed that the mother would have custody of
the child and receive monthly support payments from the father in the
sum of $100 for each of the two minor children of the marriage.' 48 On
June 11, 1963, the defendant filed a motion praying the plaintiff be re-
quired to pay not less than $400 per month for the support of both chil-
dren. Defendant provided no evidence pertaining to the needs of the
children, but based her request on the following: "In view of the plain-
144. Bethea v. Bethea, 43 N.C. App. 372, 375, 258 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1979).
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1976).
146. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).
147. 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).
148. Id. at 636, 133 S.E.2d at 489.
149. Id. at 637, 133 S.E.2d at 489.
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tiff's means and condition in life, $200 per month for the support of two
children is not a reasonable amount."'1
5 0
The court apparently agreed. Finding no facts relating to the needs of
the children, the court instead attempted to base its decision on a rudi-
mentary formula of its own making. It reasoned that the plaintiff, having
remarried a woman with one minor child, now had the responsibility of
supporting five people: himself, his new wife and child, and his two mi-
nor children from his marriage to the defendant. The court found as a
fact that the plaintiff's net income after allowable deductions was $953
per month. Split five ways, the resulting division provided $190.60 per
person per month. The court then determined that the sum of $190.60
per month was required for the support of each child in order to main-
tain them in accordance with the means and condition of life for the
plaintiff. 15
Without making a specific statement as to the reasons why, the North
Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the use of this method for award
determination stating only "we do not approve the method used in the
court below in arriving at the amount awarded for the support of the
minor children involved herein." '52 It may well be that the court was
swayed by the lack of evidence pertaining to the specific needs of the
children. 5 3 Without such evidence, the use of a formula such as this has
in it all the dangers inherent in any blindly applied mechanical method.
In 1981, the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the use of a
formula for determining a support award in Falls v. Falls.154 Here, the
husband appealed the trial court's decision on several levels, among
which were "the Findings and Conclusions in which the amount of child
support automatically increases each September based on the Cost of
Living Index and is contingent on the needs of the children likewise
increasing."
55
The Order, in allowing a cost of living adjustment, (COLA) specified
the following:
The amount of the monthly child support payment for each child shall be
increased for the succeeding 12 months by such amount, if any, as may
be necessary to keep the level of the payments, during those succeeding
12 months at a consistent level by comparison of the United States Con-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 641, 133 S.E.2d at 492.
153. Id.
154. 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546 (1981); but see, Frykberg v. Frykberg, 76 N.C. App. 401,
333 S.E.2d 766 (1985), where the court held that a "provision for automatic increases in child sup-
port as a function on the Consumer Price Index, contained in the contractual agreement of the
parties and not incorporated into the consent judgement, is not void as against public policy." (Em-
phasis added).
155. Falls, 52 N.C. App. at 205, 278 S.E.2d at 549.
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sumer Cost of Living Index for the month of September, 1980, for the
same month of the year of 1981 and each year thereafter. If the Index is
revised by changing the base period, this shall be taken into consideration
.... [i]f at any time the government of the United States ceases to com-
pile and publish the ... Index, then the obligation of the husband ...
shall be governed by other statistics, published or private, as are com-
monly accepted as reflecting with reasonable reliability the information
now contained in the ... Index.1
5 6
The court of appeals, recognizing the trend toward formula use, par-
ticularly in Iowa, I" was loath to dismiss the COLA out of hand. The
court admitted that there were some "attractive features" to its use,
among them the preservation of the original award from the "ravages of
inflation", the reduction of the burden the courts felt resulting from ad-
versary modification proceedings, the elimination of the costs of such
proceedings on the parties, and "the uncertainty such proceedings
bring." 158
Regardless of the advantages, however, the court of appeals stressed
the fact that "escalation clauses have uniformly been rejected when the
formula assumes that no change will occur in other factors affecting child
support."'5 9 The court rejected the trial court's attempt at setting up a
"self-adjusting, self-perpetuating support order in this case because the
court ignored the relevant and changing circumstances surrounding the
children and the parties."'" The major problem in the trial court's
formula was not the use of a formula in general, but rather the determin-
ing factor chosen. The Consumer Price Index was found to be an indica-
tor lacking in sufficient measures of the various factors involved in an
accurate cost of living evaluation. The fact that a number of other pub-
lished compilations of cost of living indicators existed also influenced the
court of appeals.'
6'
The greatest objection, however, lies in the court of appeal's determi-
nation that the formula -allowed "future changes in support payments
without any showing of changed circumstances of the parents."' 62 Find-
ing the formula lacking in its ability to attach relevance to the income of
156. Id. at 216, 278 S.E.2d at 555.
157. The court cited the following cases in support of its position: Peterson v. Peterson, 85 N.J.
638, 428 A.2d 1301 (1981); In re Stamp, 300 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 1980), reh. denied, (Iowa 1981);
Branstad v. Branstad, 400 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. App. 1980); In re Meeker, 272 N.W.2d 455 (Iowa 1978);
In Interest of J.M. and G.M., 585 S.W.2d 854, 856-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Mahalingam, 21
Wash. App. 228, 584 Id., at 216.
158. 52 N.C. App. at 217, 278 S.E.2d at 555.
159. Emphasis in original.
160. Emphasis in original.
161. The court cited discrepancies between the findings of the Consumer Price Index and the
Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator, which is calculated as part of the Gross National
Product. 52 N.C. App. at 218, 278 S.E.2d at 556.
162. Id. at 219, 278 S.E.2d at 557.
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the parents, the court saw a violation of the statutory requirements of the
time. 
6 3
The court did not dismiss the idea of formula use completely, however.
In closing, the opinion related what an acceptable annual adjustment
formula should minimally include.
1. Provisions focusing not only on the needs of the child, but also on
the relative abilities of the custodial and non-custodial parent to pay;
2. Provisions stating that if the non-custodial parent's income de-
creases, or increases by a lesser percentage then the percentage change in
the index, then the child support payments shall decrease or increase by a
like or lesser percentage;
3. Provisions stating that if the parties are unable to determine or
stipulate to the correct adjustment, either party may request that the
court determine the same; and
4. Provisions allowing either party to petition the court for modifica-
tion due to substantial and continuing change of circumstance.1
64
This is indicative of the realization by the courts that for a formula to
work, some allowable deviation and court discretion must be available.
Most of the ideas expressed above found their way into the final statutory
implementation of North Carolina's percentage income formula.
165
This realization was again expressed in 1982 by the court of appeals in
Hamilton v. Hamilton. 166 In Hamilton, the plaintiff mother offered two
possible formulas for determining the award according to objective crite-
ria. While not appearing in the record, it is stated that the formulas
offered were based on guidelines appearing in professional publications,
so it may be assumed that they were reasonably close to some of those
discussed above.
16 7
The importance of this case lies in the court of appeals' unqualified
support for formula-based awards. In a statement highly prophetic of
the eventual implementation, the court said:
Employment of a standard formula such as one of those suggested by
plaintiff would take into account the needs and resources of the parents,
as well as the needs of the children, and would result in fair apportion-
ment of responsibility in the majority of cases. While many others might
not fit neatly into the established guidelines, the formula would provide a
starting point for negotiations or formulation of judicial remedies. 168
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1977) which stated: Payments ordered for the support of a
minor child shall be in such amounts as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, educa-
tion, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard
of living of the child and the parties, and other facts of the particular case. (Emphasis added)
164. 52 N.C. App. at 220, 278 S.E.2d at 781.
165. See infra, pp. 38-39.
166. 57 N.C. App. 182, 290 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
167. See supra, pp. 13-25.
168. 57 N.C. App. at 183-84, 290 S.E.2d at 781 (1982).
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With this statement by the court of appeals, the stage was finally set
for the North Carolina Supreme Court's determination that formula
guidelines for deciding amounts of child support awards was not an
abuse of the trial court's discretion. This determination was forthcoming
in 1985 in Plott v. Plott.
169
Briefly, the judicial history of Plott v. Plott is as follows. Subsequent to
the parties' agreement that the father take custody of the minor child of
the marriage, the Forsyth County District Court determined that the
mother must pay $135 per month in support of that child. The mother
appealed the judgment and the North Carolina Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded.17° The District Court of Forsyth County, Gary B.
Tash, J., on remand, ordered the mother to pay $150 per month for child
support. Again she appealed and again the judgment was vacated and
remanded. 17' The court of appeals' decision was taken to the North Car-
olina Supreme Court, Frye, J., where it was held that "determining child
support amounts by the use of a mathematical formula was not an abuse
of discretion, although mathematical accuracy was required." '172
The first appellate court remand was based in part on the fact that the
statute in effect at that time placed the primary obligation of support on
the father. 17 3 Under that statute, for the mother's secondary obligation
to allow for an order requiring her to pay, a showing that the father
could not reasonably provide all the support needed by the child was
necessary. Since the facts did not bear this out, the order requiring sup-
port be provided by the non-custodial mother was held to be in error. 
1 74
In June, 1981, the statute was amended to place the primary obligation
of support equally upon the mother and father. 75 Thus, at the time of
second trial, the new statute allowed for Judge Tash's order of support
from the mother. In this light, Judge Tash made the following
determinations:
1. That the available income of the plaintiff father over and above his
reasonable expenses is approximately $886 per month;
2. That the available income of the defendant mother over and above
her reasonable expenses is approximately $180 per month; and
3. That the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and
maintenance is approximately $625 per month.1
76
169. 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).
170. 54 N.C. App. 493, 285 S.E.2d 879 (1981).
171. 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983).
172. 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).
173. See supra, note 132.
174. 65 N.C. App. at 658-59, 310 S.E.2d at 58 (1983).
175. See supra, note 135.
176. 65 N.C. App. at 660-61, 310 S.E.2d at 55-56 (1983).
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The trial court took this information, applied its own mathematical
formula, and determined the award in the following manner:
[t]he plaintiff's available income of $886 per month was found to be ap-
proximately four times the amount of defendant's $180 per month, there-
fore, defendant's share of the support obligation was set at one fourth of
the $625 needed by the child, or $150 per month.' 77
The second appeal was based in part on the defendant mother's con-
tention that to apply such a calculation was in conflict with the statutory
requirement that the trial court give "due regard to the estates, earnings,
conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties and
other facts of the particular case."'' 7 8 The appellate court agreed. Vacat-
ing the Order, the court of appeals stated that the trial court had "abused
its discretion in basing the amount of defendant's contribution on a
mathematical equation rather than her relative ability to provide support
as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(b) and (c)."' 7 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court took this opportunity to give their
support to the use of formulas. The decision was handed down on Feb-
ruary 27, 1985.180 Writing for the court, Justice Frye framed the issue as
follows: "whether a trial court abuses its discretion by applying a
formula to determine the non-custodial parent's proportionate share of
child support." 18' The court answered simply and succinctly, "no".' 82
The court, citing commentators in the field, noted that "no precise
formula exists to assist the court in determining a fair support award,
and the uniqueness of each divorce renders a precedent almost value-
less."' 83 It did, however, recognize the fact that not only were many
jurisdictions using support formulas, but that each usage was being
shown as "an effective uniform means of allocating the burden of child
support proportionately between parents in accordance with their respec-
tive financial resources."' 18 4 Reciting the court of appeals' language in
Hamilton,8" the supreme court determined that the use by a trial judge
of a formula "based on a ratio established by the parties' disposable in-
come figures seems a fair method to apply so that parents can share
equally the responsibility for supporting their children."' 86 With this
177. Id. at 161.
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1981).
179. 65 N.C. App. at 669, 310 S.E.2d at 58 (1983).
180. 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).
181. Id. at 64, 326 S.E.2d at 864, 865.
182. Id.
183. Note, Inflation-Proof of Child Support Decrees: Trajectory to a Polestar, 66 IOWA L. REV.
131, 135 (1980).
184. 313 N.C. at 78, 326 S.E.2d at 872.
185. See supra, note 163 and accompanying text.
186. Plott, 313 N.C. at 79, 326 S.E.2d at 873.
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supreme court approval, the next step was the statutory interpretation of
a uniform guideline for child support awards.
4. The Statute
Responding to the federal mandate requiring support guidelines be en-
acted by states wishing to participate in the benefits of various AFDC
programs,"8 7 the North Carolina legislature appointed the Child Sup-
port Study Committee to research the question.188 At the same time,
during the 1985 Conference of Chief District Court Judges, the Child
Support Guidelines Committee was appointed by Judge Lester Martin at
the request of Chief Justice Branch, to develop a uniform guideline
system. '"89
The legislature's study committee, meeting on March 21, 1986, heard
from Janet Mason of the Institute of Government who reported both on
the Department of Human Resources (DHR) Task Force Report to the
Secretary of DHR, and the report of the Conference of Chief District
Court Judges to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.' 90 The Study
Committee instructed the staff to draft a bill incorporating the following:
1. That the Conference of Chief District Court Judges shall draw the
guidelines;
2. That the guidelines shall be advisory in nature;
3. That in two years time the Administrative Office of the Courts
shall survey the judicial districts on the effectiveness of the guidelines and
report to the General Assembly.191
After reviewing the formulas in use around the country at that time,
and considering comments and suggestions from over twenty-five district
court judges, the committee of the Conference of Chief District Court
Judges drafted the recommendation that the percentage income formula
in use in Wisconsin 92 be adopted to operate statewide as guidelines for
determining the child support obligations of each parent. 93 The com-
mittee further recommended that allowable deviations from the formula
awards be limited in basis to one or more of the following:
(a). Special needs of the child, including physical and emotional health
needs, educational needs, day-care costs, or needs related to the child's
age;
187. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text.
188. Legislative Research Comm'n, Report to the 1985 Gen. Ass. of North Carolina, (1986
Session).
189. Child Support Guidelines Committee of the Conference of Dist. St. Judges, Report (Feb.
1986).
190. Legislative Research Comm'n, supra note 188 at 3c.
191. Id. More detailed minutes of the meeting are available in the Legislative Library at the
Legislative Building, Raleigh, N.C.
192. See supra, pp. 20-25.
193. See supra, note 189.
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(b). Shared physical custody arrangements or extended or unusual visi-
tation arrangements;
(c). A party's other support obligations to a current or former
household;
(d). A party's extremely low or extremely high income, such that appli-
cation of the guidelines produces an amount that is clearly too high in
relation to the party's own needs or the child's needs;
(e). A party's intentional suppression or reduction of income, hidden
income, income that should be imputed to a party, or a party's substan-
tial assets;
(f). Support that a party is providing or will be providing other than by
periodic money payments, such as lump sum payments, possession of a
residence, payment of a mortgage, payment of medical expenses, or pro-
vision of health insurance coverage;
(g). A party's own special needs, such as unusual medical or other nec-
essary expenses;
(h). Any other factor the court finds to be just and proper. 194
The committee concluded with the recommendation that the statutes be
amended to direct a periodic review and revision of the guidelines.19 5
The committee's report was fairly specific in its relation of the underly-
ing premises for its dete-mination. Citing the simplicity of the guideline,
the committee stressed the importance of the guideline's ability to invite
the exercise of judicial discretion, encourage settlements, increase consis-
tency, and improve the efficiency of hearing cases and writing orders.
196
The report relates the committee's determination that gross income is a
fairer and easier basis to use than net income, 197 and echoes the statutory
rule that both parents have an equal duty to support 198 even though the
custodial parent's obligation "does not flow through the court."1 99 Rec-
ognizing that guidelines had already found their way into the North Car-
olina family law practice, the committee in closing, summed up the
purpose of their task as follows:
The issuance of uniform guidelines is not intended to drastically reform
the way in which child support amounts are being determined in the
state: thus, the recommended guidelines are the same as or similar to
those that are already being used by a number of judges in the state.200
In 1986, upon receipt of the committee's recommendations, the Gen-
eral Assembly of North Carolina ratified Chapter 1016 of Senate Bill 924
entitled "An Act to Achieve Greater Consistency and Equity in the Set-
194. Id.
195. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-148 (1986), which addresses the annual conference of the chief
district judges.
196. See supra, note 189.
197. Id.
198. N.C. GEN, STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1987).
199. See supra, note 103 and accompanying text.
200. See supra, note 189.
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ting of Child Support Obligation Amounts Through the Use of Guide-
lines." The statutes were amended to incorporate the power confided in
the Conference of Chief District Court Judges for the prescription of the
-guidelines, and the provisions for variation from them based on the eight
factors described above.2 °1 The bill also provided for the date of effec-
tiveness, October 1, 1987.202
Because of the relative recent institution of the North Carolina guide-
lines, there are no cases which have completed the appellate process fur-
ther defining the guidelines' application. In order to attempt to analyze
the hurdles North Carolina is likely to meet, it is necessary to examine
this state's institution of the guidelines in comparison to how the same
guidelines have been amended and applied over the last several years in
the state of Wisconsin.
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE WISCONSIN FORMULA
IN NORTH CAROLINA
As has already been discussed, the percentage income guidelines in
Wisconsin underwent many significant alterations over the period of time
between implementation and reaching the level of rebuttable presump-
tion.2"3 What changes will be deemed necessary in North Carolina re-
mains to be seen as formula-based judgments make their way through the
appellate process.
The North Carolina legislature has had the opportunity to see this
formula at work and has incorporated many of the Wisconsin amend-
ments to their original statute in its implementation here. Only two of
Wisconsin's amended factors are absent in the North Carolina statute:
that of the desirability that the custodial parent remain in the home as a
full-time parent, and the tax consequences of the award to each party. 2"
There are strong arguments both for and against the desirability of the
custodial parent remaining in the home. It has already been shown how
economically difficult it is for a single parent to maintain the pre-divorce
standard of living in the custodial home. Given that this is a primary
concern 20 5 and realizing that the application of the percentage income
standard requires the presumption that the custodial parent will expend a
proportionate amount directly on the child,2 °6 it would seem mandatory
that the custodial parent contribute an income of some kind. In addi-
tion, arguments against the use of formulas have often centered on the
201. Id.
202. This is the date mandated by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984. See
supra, note 5 and accompanying text.
203. See supra, pp. 21-23.
204. Wis. STAT. §§ 767.25 (lm)(d) and (h) (1987).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(c) (1987).
206. See supra, note 103 and accompanying text.
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guideline's encouragement of the custodial parent not to work.2" 7 This
could operate to place an unfair burden on the supporting spouse, as well
as to deprive the child of the increased standard of living. Of course the
argument in favor of such a consideration is the obvious benefit to the
child of having a parent in the home. In addition, the absence of the
increases in costs due to a working single parent's lifestyle2 °8 may make
up somewhat the loss in income. This will have to be monitored in the
application of the guidelines to determine the necessity of a like amend-
ment to the North Carolina statutes.
The second Wisconsin factor to be ignored by the North Carolina leg-
islature is the tax consequences faced by each parent. This refers to what
are known in Wisconsin as "Lester Payments".2 °" Since North Carolina
has no corollary system, there does not seem to be a necessity for such a
consideration to be included in the statutory factors here.
Another difference between the two systems is North Carolina's lack
of a statutory definition of "gross income". This will no doubt be argued
extensively as the guidelines are implemented. As cases being appealed
on this question are resolved, some working definition must be drafted.
It was noted that one of the reasons Wisconsin chose to use gross income
over net was the future intent of the state to withhold support awards
automatically from the paycheck of the supporting spouse, much like an
income tax is withheld.2" ° There is no record of a like intent by the
North Carolina legislature. The only reference given to the choice of
gross income by the Judicial Committee was that it is "fairer and easier
to use than net income."2"' Perhaps they are waiting to see if Wisconsin
is successful in its plan. Regardless, the importance of a definitive deter-
mination of what constitutes gross income for the purposes of applying
the guideline percentages is plainly recognizable.
There are two factors for consideration included by the Judge's Com-
mittee which are not found in the Wisconsin version. One is a reflection
of caselaw precedent, while the other is merely a recognition of the value
of judicial discretion as opposed to the mechanical application of the
guidelines.
The first provides that when the income of the non-custodial parent is
either so high or so low that the award resulting under the guidelines is
inequitable, the trial court may deviate from the formula.212 The pur-
pose of this subsection is two-fold. On the surface, this allows the court
to modify a guideline award in order to ensure equity in the support
207. See supra, p. 7.
208. See supra, pp. 3-4.
209. BALISLE, supra note 72, at 17.
210. See supra, p. 21.
211. See supra, note 196.
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(cl)(4) (1987).
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obligation. Arguments could easily be made against such a modification,
however, and it is difficult to envision a situation where this considera-
tion on its own would operate to nullify a guideline award. If a parent is
making an extremely high income so that the award indicated by the
guideline is greatly above the child's documented need, it could still be
argued that the child has the right to the surplus under the policy of
maintaining his former standard of living. If the income of the parent is
only $400 per month, does that mean that the child is not eligible for his
$68 share? The parental obligation to support remains the same regard-
less of the amount of income available for distribution.
It is in the second, underlying purpose of this subsection that its real
value may be found. It is a statement to all those involved in making
award determinations that the guidelines are not infallible. Applied
without consideration to the extremes of a situation, these formulas can
result in inequitable burdens and unfair results. This subsection's pri-
mary function, therefore, is as a warning not to let the formula guidelines
blindly administer justice on their own.
The second subsection found only in North Carolina statute allows the
court to consider evidence that the income of the supporting spouse at
the time of the award hearing is not indicative of either their actual assets
or earning capacity. Ordinarily, the ability of the supporting spouse to
pay an award is determined by his or her income at the time of the judg-
ment.2 13 However, there have been instances where the court has discov-
ered any number of efforts by the non-custodial parent to present an
incorrect picture of the income subject to an award distribution. Deliber-
ate attempts by the supporting parent to depress earning capability,214
excessive spending in disregard for the support obligation,21 5 or complete
failure to exercise the capacity to earn an income,2 16 will operate to allow
the judge to base an award on the application of the guidelines to the
parent's capacity to earn rather than actual earnings.
All of the cases on this point were decided prior to the institution of
the guidelines. It may be assumed that the frequency with which the
issue has arisen had something to do with the Judge's Committee attach-
ment of such importance to it. Again, it serves to illustrate the fact that
the guidelines do not automatically ensure fairness. It also serves to reit-
erate the value and need for a comprehensive definition of gross income.
The remaining subsections of the North Carolina statute may be di-
vided into two groups: those serving to increase the child's needs over
213. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985); Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328
S.E.2d 47 (1985).
214. Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 290 S.E.2d 751 (1982).
215. Beall v. Beal, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).
216. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976); Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App.
172, 275 S.E.2d 546 (1980).
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and above the guideline award, and those serving to mitigate the financial
ability of the supporting parent to meet his obligation to pay.21 7 They
are logical and self-explanatory in nature, easily proved or disproved by a
sufficient evidentiary showing. As the application of the guidelines is
currently limited to an advisory capacity, it would seem that the parties
involved in support litigation have the propensity for adequate protec-
tion. Only time and the appellate process will tell.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main question waiting to be answered in North Carolina is
whether the guidelines will attain the level of rebuttable presumptiveness.
Certainly the lessons learned in Wisconsin necessitating such a change
will apply here as well. While it is arguably reasonable to allow time and
process to determine the actual need, much effort could have been saved
by giving proper credence to the historical precedents offered by Wiscon-
sin. Making the guidelines a rebuttable presumption is the natural pro-
gression of the use of the percentage income formula. The primary goals
as stated by the North Carolina legislature are to achieve consistency and
fairness in awarding child support, while at the same time allowing judi-
cial discretion on a case by case basis. Mandating the use of the formula
percentages with the understanding that deviations must be adequately
proved to be in the best interests of the parties functions to fulfill these
goals to a greater certainty than is otherwise achievable.
What the future holds for formula use in the determination of child
support awards in North Carolina remains to be seen. There is no ques-
tion but that the need for such controls existed.
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(2),(3),(6), and (7), which operate to mitigate the parent's obligation.
* B.S. 1975, University of Kansas; J.D. 1989 North Carolina Central University of Law. Mr.
Donovan was the Associate Editor of the NCCU Law Journal for 1988-89, and is currently em-
ployed as a staff attorney with the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
34
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 [1989], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol18/iss2/6
